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Abstract 
This paper designs a market platform for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
energy trading in Transactive Energy (TE) systems, where 
prosumers and consumers actively participate in the market as 
seller or buyer to trade energy. An auction-based approach is 
used for market clearing in the proposed platform and a review 
of different types of auction is performed. The appropriate 
auction approach for market clearing in the proposed platform 
is designed. The proposed auction mechanism is implemented 
in three steps namely determination, allocation and payment. 
This paper identifies important P2P market clearing 
performance indices, which are used to compare and contrast 
the designed auction with different types of auction 
mechanisms. Comparative studies demonstrate the efficacy of 
the proposed auction mechanism for market clearing in the P2P 
platform. 
1 Introduction 
Today`s grid is characterized by increasing levels of distributed 
energy resources (DERs), demand response programs, and 
energy efficiency initiatives. With the increasing penetration of 
DERs, the traditional energy consumers have become 
prosumers, who can both produce and consume energy [1]. 
Increasing level of DERs confronts the grid with significant 
consequences, which introduces new challenges for 
distribution system operators [2]. Power distribution system 
needs a new framework to facilitate the use of DERs by 
enabling them to join traditional providers in production, 
buying and selling electricity [3]. Transactive Energy (TE) is 
such a novel framework and according to the GridWise 
Architecture Council (GWAC) is defined as “a system of 
economic and control mechanisms that allows the dynamic 
balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical 
infrastructure using value as a key operational parameter”. TE 
systems can improve efficiency and reliability of the grid and 
help system operators to manage the increasing complexity of 
the grid. Implementing TE requires a clear mental model that 
is applicable and actionable. One area of concern for discussion 
of TE is policy and market design [4]. In the market design in 
TE systems, policies should be designed in a way that 
maximizes customer engagement via two-way interaction and 
accommodates the scale of DERs that will enter the system in 
the future. Design of this new market motivates prosumers and 
consumers to use electricity generated by renewable energy 
resources. A novel energy trading mechanism among 
prosumers, which can be used in TE systems is called Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) energy trading which contributes to the balance of 
energy [5] and reduces congestions on transmission and 
distribution lines [6]. The P2P approach provides localized 
energy trading which facilitates system operation with a large 
penetration of DERs as inter-connected nodes in a network. In 
this context, a P2P market platform is presented in this paper, 
which enables direct energy trading among prosumers and 
consumers. 
 
Design of localized energy trading platform has been 
investigated in some recent works. The overview of P2P 
communication technologies and different interoperability 
issues for the smart grids market platform has been reported in 
[7, 8]. A four-layered architecture for the smart grid is 
presented in [9], where the details of the market platform are 
not addressed. The decentralized P2P framework has been 
proposed in [10] and [11], where only renewable energy 
producers’ perspective is considered. A self-sustainable 
community of prosumers is proposed by authors in [12], where 
a load aggregated on behalf of prosumers participate in the 
market. Although incentivize all DERs owners to participate in 
the market, these studies overlook the importance of satisfying 
both consumers and prosumers. 
 
An important step in developing a P2P electricity market is the 
design of market clearing method. In the P2P market, energy 
allocation and electricity price should be determined in a way 
that incentivizes both prosumers and consumers to participate 
in the market. The auction-based approach can be used as 
market clearing mechanism, where it can be applied to any 
market with different numbers of sellers and buyers. Design of 
auction for different purposes has been addressed in some 
recent works. Authors in [13] propose an auction-based 
approach for sharing storage capacity among the residential 
community and shared facilities controller. Knapsack 
approximation algorithm is used in [14] as market clearing 
mechanism for a single seller and multiple buyers. A Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is proposed in [15] to 
maximize the social welfare in demand side management. 
Social welfare of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles is maximized 
in a localized P2P electricity trading using an iterative double 
auction in [16]. Authors in [17] propose two variants of VCG 
mechanism to charge plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in 
2 
residential distribution networks. A novel two-phase auction 
format for on-line scheduling of demand side aggregation is 
presented in [18].   
 
In this paper, an auction-based market clearing approach is 
presented, which is unique in its ability to enable sellers and 
buyers to trade energy through a platform based on a set of 
rules and satisfying both sellers and buyers at the same time. A 
review of the most recognized types of auctions is performed 
to investigate important features of auctions and then, an 
appropriate auction mechanism is designed for market clearing 
to satisfy both prosumers and consumers in the market. A set 
of indices is defined to compare the proposed auction 
mechanism with other types of auction. The main contributions 
of this paper include the following aspects: 
- Propose a market platform for P2P energy trading in TE 
environment 
- Design auction approach for market clearing in the 
proposed platform 
- Compare performance of the designed auction with 
different types of auction for market clearing in the 
proposed platform 
This paper is structured as follows: The P2P market framework 
is presented in Section 2. The required features and rules of the 
auction for market clearing in this system are cleared in Section 
3, followed by a review of different types of auction. The 
proposed auction for market clearing in the P2P market is 
designed in Section 4. Finally, the numerical analysis is 
provided in Section 5 and some concluding remarks are drawn 
in Section 6. 
2 P2P market platform 
This paper proposes a four-layered framework based on the 
GWAC TE framework for P2P energy trading among sellers 
and buyers in distribution network [3]. Sellers are prosumers 
with excess energy having their own objective to maximize 
their revenue in the market, whereas buyers can be either 
prosumers or consumers. Different layers of the proposed 
framework are decision making layer, business layer, cyber 
layer and component layer. In decision making layer, sellers 
offer the amount of energy and their reservation price, whereas 
buyers bid for their demanded energy. Network constraints are 
monitored in the data centre of the P2P market, which is 
connected to Distribution System Operator (DSO). An 
unregulated environment, where energy related services are 
freely produced, traded, sold and consumed among several 
market players through the smart market is provided in the 
business layer. The cyber layer contains smart meter, data 
centre and all communication infrastructures to enable the 
proposed function of the transactions in the business layer. The 
component layer is the physical distribution of all participating 
components in the distribution grid. 
 
In this framework, market clearing is performed in the business 
layer, where an auction-based approach is considered to clear 
the market in a way that incentivizes market players to use this 
framework. The proposed P2P market is an hourly auction, 
where sellers offer their surplus energy to the market and 
buyers bid for their demand. In designing market for the TE 
framework, the following assumptions are considered: 
- Buyers/sellers know the market price and Feed-in Tariff (FIT) 
and submit their bids/offers truthfully based on these 
quantities. 
- Buyers can buy their required amount of energy from multiple 
sellers and consequently, sellers can sell their energy to several 
buyers. 
- The total network is divided into several blocks and 
prosumers who can transfer energy to each other using existed 
network are members of the same block and participate in the 
same auction. 
- Buyers and sellers in the same block can use the existed 
network to transfer energy without paying a transfer fee. 
- Each seller/buyer submits one offer/bid and any other 
offer/bid would be considered as from separate seller/buyer for 
auction purposes. 
 
Consider a market with a set of 𝒩𝒩 = {1, … ,𝑁𝑁} sellers and 
ℳ = {1, … ,𝑀𝑀} buyers who participate in the auction. The 
offer of seller i indicates the amount of energy (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) and 
reservation price for this energy (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖), while bid of buyer j 
represents the demanded energy (𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗) and the offered price for 
this energy (𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗). The objective in the P2P market is to 
maximize the revenue of sellers and cost saving of buyers at 
the same time. Therefore, the total revenue and cost saving of 
all players (TRC) is defined as (1): 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1   (1) 
where i and j are indices of seller and buyer respectively. The 
revenue of seller i (Ri) and cost saving of buyer j (Cj) can be 
defined as (2) and (3): 
 
Figure 1: Energy trading framework in distribution network 
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𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = ∑ �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   (2) 
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 − 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (3) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 are the amount of sold energy by seller i to 
buyer j and its corresponding price respectively, whereas 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 
and 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 represents the amount and price of bought energy by 
buyer j from seller i. In the proposed P2P market, the allocation 
and price of energy is indicated using auction approach. The 
market clearing for each time slot “t” is performed in the 
previous time slot “t-1” as follow: 
Step 1: Collecting offers/bids from sellers/buyers and market 
price and FIT from local generator. 
Step 2: Conducting auction and indicating allocation and price 
of energy 
Step 3: Informing sellers/buyers for the final allocation and 
cleared market price.  
An appropriate auction mechanism is required in Step 2 to 
enable competitive P2P energy trading which is discussed in 
the next section. 
3 Auction approach for market clearing 
3.1 Auction properties and rules 
The auction is defined as “a well-specified negotiation 
mechanism mediated by an intermediary that can be considered 
as an automated set of rules” [19]. Auctions have several 
properties and can be categorized based on their features. The 
most important features of auction are: 
  
- Open or sealed-bid: In an open auction, bidders know about 
other participants’ bids, but in the sealed-bid auction, the bid 
of bidders is not publicly known. 
- One-sided or two-sided: In one-sided auction, only buyers 
submit bids, but in the double auction, both buyers and sellers 
submit bids. 
- Single or multi-unit auction: In single unit auction buyers bids 
for one unit, whereas in multi-unit auction buyers bids for 
multiple units. 
- Strong balanced budget (SBB) or Weak balanced budget 
(WBB): In the SBB auction the auctioneer should not lose or 
gain money, while in the WBB auction the auctioneer can gain 
money, but should not lose money.  
Appropriate auction mechanism for use in the P2P market is a 
sealed-bid, two-sided and multi-unit auction. This auction is 
SBB as there is no real auctioneer and energy trading is 
performed using a platform. Each auction has specific rules and 
buyers and sellers should participate in the auction based on 
these rules. The auction for the proposed P2P framework is 
implemented in three steps namely determination where the 
number of sellers and buyers who can participate in the auction 
is identified; Allocation where energy share for seller and 
buyers are resolved; Payment is where the auction prices for 
buyers and sellers for traded energy are settled.  
3.2 Review of different types of auction 
In this paper, different types of auction and their properties are 
compared to find the appropriate auction for P2P market 
clearing. The most recognized types of auction in the electricity 
market are one-sided and only buyers bid in the auction such 
as uniform price, pay as bid Vickrey, and Generalized second 
price auction. However, there are other types of auction where 
both buyers and sellers participate (Double or two-sided 
auction) and the determination step indicates that only buyers 
with bids higher than reservation price of sellers can participate 
in the auction, but the number of participant sellers (L) and 
buyers (K) is different in various auction types. The most 
recognized double auctions are double auction with average 
mechanism, VCG mechanism, trade reduction mechanism, and 
McAfee`s mechanism. 
 
Allocation method in all auctions is based on “greedy” 
algorithm and energy from a seller with lower offer 
(reservation price) (ri) is allocated to buyers with higher bid 
(bj). Number of participant sellers/buyers in the auction is the 
same in all double auction except double auction with trade 
reduction and McAfee mechanism, where only L-1 sellers and 
K-1 buyers trade energy. The most important difference 
between various types of double auction is in the payment rule, 
in which in the double auction with average mechanism, all 
buyers should pay the average of reservation price of sellers 
and bid of buyers. In Trade reduction mechanism the auction 
price is rL for sellers and bK for buyers, whereas, in McAfee 
mechanism, the payment is based on the average of rL+1 and 
bK+1 [20]. The only auction which has the required properties 
for P2P market clearing is a double auction with average 
mechanism. In the next section, a new auction mechanism for 
market clearing is designed and then the performance of this 
mechanism is compared with all of the aforementioned 
mechanisms. 
4 Auction design for market clearing in P2P 
market 
4.1 Determination rule  
The determination rule for the proposed auction is the same as 
the aforementioned auction types, where after collecting all 
bids and offers from buyers and sellers, the determination rule 
identifies the number of sellers and buyers selected to 
participate in the auction as below:  
 - Sellers’ declare their reservation price 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  and these prices are 
arranged in increasing order as 𝑟𝑟1 < 𝑟𝑟2 < ⋯  < 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁; whereas 
buyers’ bids are arranged in decreasing order as 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏2 >
⋯ > 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀. 
- Aggregated supply and demand curve is generated. 
 - Let k be the largest index such that 𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾 ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿  (the "breakeven 
point"). The first L sellers sell the energy to the first K buyers. 
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 4.2 Allocation rule 
A greedy algorithm is used for allocation of energy from sellers 
to buyers, where energy from the seller with lowest reservation 
price is allocated to the buyer with the highest bid. However, 
the procedure of matching buyers and sellers depends upon the 
method of players’ participation in the auction. A seller/buyer 
can participate in the market in two ways, e.g. fractional or 
non-fractional participation where seller/buyer can win any 
fraction of its offer/bid or total offer/bid after market clearing 
respectively. The allocation of energy can be performed from 
sellers perspective or buyers perspective, where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ and 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ 
indicates the sold/bought energy by seller/buyer in the market 
respectively. The allocation from the buyer/seller perspective 
is based on fractional knapsack problem, where buyers/sellers 
can decide to whether participate in the market fractionally or 
non-fractionally. 
 
The major difference between these two algorithms is the 
priority in the allocation of energy, in which in the first 
scenario the priority is to allocate energy to buyers to satisfy 
their demand, but in the second scenario, priority is to allocate 
energy from sellers to reach their offered energy. The 
allocation algorithm from buyers’ perspective is shown in table 
1. The final allocation of energy is different depends on the 
total offered energy by sellers (∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1 ) and total demanded 
energy by buyers (∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1 ). If ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1 , the final 
allocation is the same for two algorithms. And if ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1 <
∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐾𝐾
𝑗𝑗=1 , the allocation is performed from buyers` perspective, 
to indicate the method of participation of the last buyer; 
otherwise allocation will be performed from sellers` 
perspective to enable the last seller to decide on the method of 
his participation. 
4.3 Payment rule 
The next step after energy allocation is identifying the price of 
traded energy. The designed market should be balanced for 
both sellers and buyers to incentivize them to participate in the 
P2P market. Therefore, the total revenue of sellers should be 
equal to the total cost saving of buyers as in (4). 
∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿
𝑖𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1   (4) 
Also, as discussed in Section 3, the appropriate auction for the 
P2P market is SBB, which means that the total money paid by 
buyers goes to sellers i.e. for each individual i and j 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 (5) 
Theorem 1- The auction has a balanced performance for both 
sellers and buyers if the price of energy is indicated by (6): 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗2  (6) 
Proof- By substituting (2) and (3) in (4) and expanding, it can 
be written as (7) 
∑ �𝜆𝜆1,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟1�𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥1,𝑗𝑗 + ⋯+ ∑ �𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗   
=∑ �𝑏𝑏1 − 𝜌𝜌1,𝑖𝑖�𝑞𝑞1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾 − 𝜌𝜌𝐾𝐾,𝑖𝑖�𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                   (7) 
where it can be expanded again as (8) 
𝑥𝑥1,1�𝜆𝜆1,1 − 𝑟𝑟1� + ⋯+ 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾�𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿� = 
𝑞𝑞1,1�𝑏𝑏1 − 𝜌𝜌1,1� + ⋯+ 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾,𝐿𝐿�𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾 − 𝜌𝜌𝐾𝐾,𝐿𝐿�                          (8) 
The sold energy by seller i to buyer j is equal to the bought 
energy by buyer j from seller i. Therefore, for each individual 
i and j, 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖  (9) 
Substituting (5) and (9) in (8) yields that the price of traded 
energy should be equal to average of  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 for each 
individual i and as shown in (6). 
Theorem 2- In the proposed market, if the used auction for 
market clearing is SBB, the total revenue of sellers and cost 
saving of buyers is independent of the price of traded energy. 
Proof- TRC can be written in the expanded format as (10). 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1             = ∑ �𝜆𝜆1,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟1�𝑥𝑥1,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + ⋯+ ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾 − 𝜌𝜌𝐾𝐾,𝑖𝑖�𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             = 𝑥𝑥1,1�𝜆𝜆1,1 − 𝑟𝑟1� + ⋯+ 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾,𝐿𝐿�𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾 − 𝜌𝜌𝐾𝐾,𝐿𝐿�              (10) 
Substituting (7) yields 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑥𝑥1,1�𝜆𝜆1,1 − 𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑏𝑏1 − 𝜌𝜌1,1� + ⋯+ 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾�𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 +
𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾 − 𝜌𝜌𝐾𝐾,𝐿𝐿�                                                                       (11) 
Again by substituting (8), TRC can be rewritten as (12), which 
shows its independence to the price of traded energy. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1   (12) 
4.4 P2P market performance indices 
In addition to TRC, another important index in designing an 
auction mechanism is the satisfaction of market players at the 
end of each time slot. Seller and Buyer Satisfaction Index (SSI 
and BSI) can be defined as (13) and (14) respectively. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖   (13) 
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1   (14) 
SSI/BSI shows the proportion of the real income/cost of 
seller/buyer to the expected income/cost. The higher value of 
SSI and BSI indicates higher satisfaction of seller and buyer 
respectively and SSI and BSI lower than 1, show 
dissatisfaction of them. Market Tendency Index (MTI), which 
shows the skewness of the market is determined by averaging 
1: Arrange sellers in ascending order and buyers in descending order 
2:        for j starts from 1 to K do 
3:              for i starts from 1 to L do 
4:                    if 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 then 
5:                         𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗and update 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
6:                    else if 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 > 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  AND 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝐾𝐾 then 
7:                         Add 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 till 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ≤ ∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
8:                         𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗and update 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
9:                    else if 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 > 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  AND 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐾𝐾 then 
10:                             if 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1  then 
11:                                 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾and update 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
12:                             else if 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾 > ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1  then 
13:                                𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾∗ = 0 if buyer is non-fractional 
14:                                 𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾∗ = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1 if buyer is fractional 
15:                              end if    
16:                   end if    
17:              end for 
18:         end for 
19:   The (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗∗) is achieved.  
Table 1: Allocation algorithm from buyers’ perspective 
 
5 
of satisfaction of all market players as defined in (15). If the 
value of MTI is greater than 1, the market is more beneficial 
for buyers and it is skewed toward sellers if MTI is less than 1. 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 = ∑ �𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1𝐾𝐾 �𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1
∑ �
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1
𝐿𝐿
�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1
  (15) 
5 Numerical analysis 
This section provides the numerical analysis to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed P2P market and the designed 
auction mechanism for market clearing. One auction round is 
considered for a block with 16 players (eight buyers and eight 
sellers). In this market, based on determination rule, the first 
five sellers and five buyers can trade energy for the next time 
slot in the auction, i.e. 𝐾𝐾 = 𝐿𝐿 = 5 and the last three sellers and 
buyers lose the auction. Input data including sellers’ submitted 
offers and buyers’ submitted bids are tabulated in Table 2. 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, since 
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
5
𝑖𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗5𝑗𝑗=1 = 700, the final allocation is the same in 
both allocation algorithms (sellers` perspective and buyers` 
perspective). 
 
The allocation of energy for buyers and sellers and its 
corresponding price in the designed auction are given in Table 
3. In this table, the amount of traded energy between each seller 
and buyer is specified using the allocation algorithm, where 
energy from sellers with lower reservation price is allocated to 
the buyers with higher bid and the price is obtained by (6). 
Auction prices in different auction mechanisms are presented 
in Table 4 to have a base scheme for comparison with the 
proposed mechanism. These prices are specified using 
offers/bids of seller/buyers and based on the payment 
mechanism in each auction. It is noteworthy that in this case 
study, auction price for McAfee mechanism is the same as 
trade reduction mechanism and consequently the final results 
would be the same for both mechanisms. Therefore, the 
following discussion and results for trade reduction mechanism 
are valid for McAfee mechanism. 
 
A comparative study is performed for different auctions and 
TRC, MTI, revenue of sellers and cost saving of buyers for 
these auctions are given in Figure 2. TRC for double auction 
with VCG mechanism is the highest, however, this mechanism 
is not SBB, and the amount of received money by sellers is 
more than paid money by buyers. The lowest TRC is for double 
auction with trade reduction mechanism (also McAfee 
mechanism), where based on auction rules, seller L, and buyer 
K cannot trade energy and total traded energy decreases. This 
mechanism is not SBB too because the money paid by buyers 
is higher than received money by sellers. As it said in the 
previous section since in P2P market there is no real agent as 
moderator, the used auction should be SBB and all monetary 
transfers should be done between buyers and sellers. TRC for 
other payment mechanisms is the same, as proved in Theorem 
2. 
 
Total revenue of sellers in pay as bid and the generalized 
second price is higher in comparison to other payment 
mechanisms. In pay as bid mechanism, the total cost saving of 
buyers is zero and this mechanism is beneficial for sellers only. 
The highest total cost saving of buyers occurs in Vickrey 
mechanism. The total cost saving of buyers is equal to revenue 
of sellers in the proposed mechanism which shows the 
balanced performance of this mechanism. Figure 2 also shows 
MTI of the different payment mechanism. The Pay as bid 
mechanism has the lowest MTI which means this market is 
more beneficial for sellers and this mechanism is the best one 
from the sellers perspective. MTI in the Vickrey auction has 
the highest value (greater than 1) that shows the market is more 
beneficial for buyers. Double auction with average mechanism 
has the nearest MTI to 1, while MTI in the proposed 
mechanism is equal to 1, which means this auction has a 
balanced performance for both sellers and buyers and is 
appropriate for use in the P2P market platform. 
Seller/Buyer No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sellers` 
offers 
ri 
(¢/kWh) 10.0 10.5 11.0 12.0 12.1 12.5 13.0 13.2 
xi(Wh) 200 150 100 150 100 100 150 100 
Buyers` 
bids 
bj 
(¢/kWh) 14.0 13.5 13.0 12.5 12.2 12.0 11.5 11.0 
qj(Wh) 150 150 200 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 2: Input data; offers/bids by sellers/buyers 
 
 
Amount of traded energy between seller i and buyer j  and its 
corresponding price (𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊,𝒋𝒋 = 𝒒𝒒𝒋𝒋,𝒊𝒊)(𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾)/(𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊,𝒋𝒋 = 𝝆𝝆𝒋𝒋,𝒊𝒊)(¢/𝒌𝒌𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾) 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
B1 150 12.00 50 11.75 0 11.50 0 11.25 0 11.10 
B2 0 12.25 100 12.00 50 11.75 0 11.50 0 11.35 
B3 0 12.50 0 12.25 100 12.00 0 11.75 0 11.60 
B4 0 13.00 0 12.75 50 12.50 100 12.25 0 12.10 
B5 0 13.05 0 12.80 0 12.55 0 12.30 100 12.15 
Table 3: Allocation/price of energy in the proposed auction 
 
Auction Price for sellers 
(¢/kWh) 
Auction price for buyers 
(¢/kWh) 
Payment 
Mechanism 𝝀𝝀𝟏𝟏,𝒋𝒋 𝝀𝝀𝟐𝟐,𝒋𝒋 𝝀𝝀𝟑𝟑,𝒋𝒋 𝝀𝝀𝟒𝟒,𝒋𝒋 𝝀𝝀𝟓𝟓,𝒋𝒋 𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟑𝟑,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟒𝟒,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟓𝟓,𝒊𝒊 
Uniform 
price 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 
Vickrey 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
Average 
mechanism 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 12.08 
VCG 
Mechanism 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.10 12.10 12.10 12.10 12.10 
Trade 
reduction 12.10 12.10 12.10 12.10 - 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 - 
 Auction Price for sellers 
(¢/kWh) 
Auction price for buyers 
(¢/kWh) 
Payment 
Mechanism 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊,𝟏𝟏 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊,𝟐𝟐 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊,𝟑𝟑 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊,𝟒𝟒 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊,𝟓𝟓 𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟑𝟑,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟒𝟒,𝒊𝒊 𝝆𝝆𝟓𝟓,𝒊𝒊 
Pay as bid 14.00 13.50 13.00 12.50 12.20 14.00 13.50 13.00 12.50 12.20 
Generalized 
Second 
Price 
13.50 13.00 12.50 12.20 12.00 13.50 13.00 12.50 12.20 12.00 
Table 4: Auction price for different auction types 
 
 
6 
6 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a novel market platform for P2P energy 
trading in TE framework. In this platform, prosumers and 
consumers participate in the market as seller or buyer. An 
auction-based approach for market clearing in the proposed 
platform is presented to enable sellers and buyers to trade 
energy through a platform based on a set of rules instead of 
requiring any real third party. A novel auction mechanism is 
designed for satisfying both prosumers and consumers in the 
market at the same time and required rules of auction in the 
P2P market are determined. Numerical indices are defined to 
compare the performance of the proposed auction with 
different types of auction mechanism for the P2P market. 
Numerical results verify that the proposed mechanism satisfies 
all required features for P2P market clearing and has a balanced 
performance for both sellers and buyers. In our upcoming 
work, we are going to use the proposed auction based approach 
in conjunction with an optimization problem to take into 
account the network constraints and proposing a more accurate 
market clearing for P2P energy trading. 
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Figure 2: Graphical comparison of TRC, Sellers` revenue and 
buyers` cost saving 
 
